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1. INTRODUCTION 
,Since ancient times the fisherfolk along the coastline of India 
have been exploiting the marine fishery resources in the inshore waters 
using indigenous crafts and gears. With the advancement of research and 
technology the traditional methods of fish capture are being fast replaced 
by modern methods employing mechanised boats and gears. 
In India mechanisation started around 1950, but it is only after 
1960 that the process accelerated. One of the developments in this direction 
is the deployment of purse- seiners for fishing. While some pioneer ing work 
was done about two decades back under the Indo-Norwegian Project, it was only 
in 1977 that a large number of purse- seiners were introduced for commercial 
fishing. This wa s particularly so in the Karnataka coast where some 120 
purse- seiners were put into operation . The number is steadily increasing 
and is expected to reach 250 by the end of 1979. 
Large- scale operat i ons of purse-seiners have certainly increased the 
fish landings, especially of mackerel and sardines. A natural question here 
is whether this has any adverse effect on the activities of artisanal fisher-
men a long the coast . The present study attempts to examine the impact of 
purse- seine operations on traditional fishing, particularly Rampani, along 
the Karnataka coast. 
2. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
Karna tak~ State lies on the West Coast of India with a coastline of 
270 km. (C.M . F.R.I . 1978). There are about 145 marine fishing villages 
distributed in the t wo coastal districts of South Kanara and North Kanara . 
The fishing season begins about September and extends to May. The important 
fisheries in the area are mackerel, oil sardine, penaeid prawns, catfish, 
sciaenids and seer fish. The fish landings have been steadily increasing 
from about 0 . 76 lakh tonnes in 1969 to 1.53 lakh tonnes in 1978 . (C.M.F .R.I. 
1979). The sharp r i se in 1978 was due to the increase in the number of purse-
seine operations which alone could catch about 0.86 lakh tonnes of fish. 
In traditional fishing in Karnataka, the types of crafts commonly 
used are Rarnpani boats , dug- out canoes, canoe- type boats and outrigger boats. 
The gears generally employed are Rampani, small shore- seine, boat seine, 
gill net, drift net, cast ne t and hook and line. The most pupular gear is 
the Rampani. It is a shore- seine of exceptionally large size and is generally 
used for catching mackerel and sardines. The operation of the Rampani net 
has been described by Samuel (1968) and C.M.F.R.I . (1970). In a typical 
case, it consists of about 200 pieces laced together, with each piece measur-
ing about 10 me tres long. The head rope is buoyed with wooden or plastic 
floats and the foot rope is weighted with stones or metal balls at regular 
intervals. The net requires about 80 persons for the operation. When a shoal 
of f ish coming close to the shore is sighted, one end of the net is held at 
the shore and the Rampani boat is steered in a semi- circular path releasing 
the net and finally completing the set with the other end of the net to the 
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shore, enclosing the shoal. The net is slowly dragged, bringing the catch 
ashore. In some cases, a portion of the catch will be kept alive in the 
net and sold in stages, depending upon the market demand. 
The mechanised crafts used on the Karnataka coast are the trawler 
and the purse-seiner, the latter being introduced only in 1977. The purse-
seine, as is well known, is an encircling net . A long net attached to the 
mechanised vessel is quickly set to form a wall of webbing around a school 
of fish. (Sainsburg 1975). The bottom is pursed so that an artificial pond 
of webbing holds the catch. The pond is gradually made smaller and finally 
drawn aboard. About 26 persons are employed on a purse-seiner. The catch 
is often transported to the shore aboard carrier- boats . 
3. ESTIMATES OF MARINE FISH LANDINGS BY TYPES OF GEAR AND EFFORT 
EXPENDED 
Fish landings 
The gear estimates by types of gear of marine fish landings in 
Karnataka State in respect to oil sardine, mackerel, seer fish, sciaenids, 
cat fish, penaeid prawns and other fishes for South Kanara and North Kanara 
districts for the years 1976 to 1979 (1st half) are shown in Tables I and 
II. From the tables it is seen that the bulk of the catch of the Karnataka 
State comes from South Kanara district. In 1978 about 81 percent of the 
total catch in Karnataka State was accounted for by South Kanara district 
and this is mainly due to the large scale operations of purse-seine nets 
in the area. In fact over 90 percent of the purse-seiners are operating in 
the South Kanara area. Thus the stress in the paper is also on the opera-
tions in South Kanara. 
From Table I, it is noticed that in South Kanara district the purse-
seine catch has shown a steady increase from nil in 1976 to 83,765 tonnes 
in 1978 and 14,184 tonnes in the 1st half of 1979. In contrast, the land-
ings from Rampani have been declining from 41,202 tonnes in 1976 to 10,350 
tonnes in 1978 and a mere 109 tonnes in the 1st half of 1979. It is also 
seen that sardine and mackerel accounted for the bulk of the catch by the 
purse- seine as well as the Rampani gears. 
The total value of fish caught by purse- seines in South Kanara was 
estimated at 27 million rupees in 1977 and as much as 89 million rupees in 
1978. The estimated total value of fish from Rampani nets decreased from 
35 million rupees in 1976 to 14 million rupees in 1978. 
From Table II it is observed that in North Kanara district of 
Karnataka State, landings from purse-seines have increased from 1,166 tonnes 
in 1977 to 2,254 tonnes in 1978 and 4,351 tonnes in the first half of 1979. 
On the other hand, landings from Rampani nets decreased from 13,215 tonnes 
In 1976 to 5,953 tonnes in 1977, and then a slight increase to 7,013 tonnes 
in 1978 but only 1,960 tonnes during the first half of 1979. This indicates 
that purse-seine operations in this district have not affected Rampani fish-
ing as much as in South Kanara. 
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A study of the tables showed that in the State as a whole, 57 per-
c~nt of the total catch in 1976 was accounted for by Rampani nets which 
decreased t o 30 percent in 1977 and 11 percent in 1978. On the other hand, 
catches by purse- seines increased from 24 percent in 1977 to 56 percent of 
the total in 1978. While trawl net catches showed a steady increase in 
South Kanara, the position was more or less static in North Kanara. In 
general, other gears did not show any noticeable trend over the period under 
review . 
Number of operat i ons of units 
From Tables I and II it is observed that the number of operations 
of purse- seines showed a substantial increase from 1977 to 1979 (1st half). 
The trend is generally reversed in the case of Rampani nets. In South 
Kanara district the number of Rampani operations was about 4000 in 1976, 
5000 in 1977, 3800 in 1978 and a mere 356 in the first half of. 1979. It 
is alarming to note that the catch per operation of Rampani net has declined 
from 10.14 tonnes in 1976 to 2.73 tonnes in 1978 and 0.31 tonnes in the 
first half of 1979. 
The details of the number of purse-seine operations and Rampani 
net operation for the periods of January t o June 1978 and January to J une 
1979 are shown in Table III to indicate the latest position. From the table 
it is seen that while the number of purse-seine operations have almost doubled 
at State level, the same in respect t o Rampani nets decreased to about one-
third. There was a decline from 2320 to 356 and from 1445 to 926 in the 
number of operations of Rampani nets in South and North Kanara districts 
respectively. 
4. DISCUSSION 
Estimates by types of gear of marine fish landings in the two 
districts of South Kanara and North Kanara in Karnataka State reveal that 
the landings from purse-seines have shown a steady increase from 1976 to 
1979 (1st half), particularly in South Kanara district. The record land-
ings by purse-seines have boosted the total landings of the Karnataka State 
and the income from the fisheries sector has also increased. 
The landings from the traditional Rampani net have shown a steady 
decline from 1976 to 1979, South Kanara district being the worst hit. The 
number of operations and the catch per operation have substantially decreased 
over the period under study . The latest position shows that compared to the 
first half of 1978, the corresponding period in 1979 registered a decrease 
to one third in the number of operations in the State as a whole, and to one 
sixth if South Kanara district alone is considered. As per a 1973- 77 survey 
(C.M.F.R.I. 1978) there were 164 Rampani nets operating in Karnataka State. 
Taking 80 persons as the average number of fishermen required per net, there 
were over 13,000 active fishermen engaged in Rampani operations. With the 
fast dwindling number of operations observed, a significant number of active 
fishermen are getting displaced year after year. 
Although the increased number of purse-seine operations have helped 
in the development of fishing harbours and other infrastructure facilities 
and provided employment potential in the mechanised fishing sector, its 
adverse impact on the traditional fishermen engaged in Rampani net should 
be taken note of. 
Government and other development agencies are aware of the problem 
and they are giving preferential treatment to the affected Rampani operators 
in sanctioning loans to purchase purse- seiners on a cooperative basis . But 
this facility is likely to be cornered mostly by the more enterprising fisher -
men and the benefits may not very much percolate down to those who are conser-
vative and who do not like to move out of their traditional homelands. Also 
it may not be possible to secure employment in purse- seiner s for all those 
affected as they very much outnumber the total strength required for purse-
seine operations. 
Two suggestions are made here for the speedy rehabilitation of the 
Rampani fishermen displaced from their traditional activities. Extension and 
soc ial workers may make intensive efforts to persuade more fishermen to take 
to purse-seine operations and associated ancillary activities. It should be 
kept in mind however, there is a limit on fishing effort t hat can be directed 
to these resources which could in the future affect economic viability. Secondly, 
some of them might be induced to take up mariculture work in feasible areas in 
the fishing villages for which the Central Marine Fisheries Resear ch Institute 
has the technical know- how. The Institute is already havi ng 'lab- to- Iand' 
programmes where culture techniques are transferred from the laboratory to 
actual field conditions. Financing agencies may be encouraged to advance 
loans on a more liberal basis for such schemes to enable the affected fisher -
men to get alternative employment. 
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Table l ' 
Landings by Types o f Gear of Mar i ne Fish in South Kanara District of 
Karna taka State in India from 1976 to 1979 (1st half) in tons 
~ Purse- Other Species seine Rampani shore Trawl Gill Drift seine Net net net Ot hers 
1976 
Oil sardine - 34,812 103 - 570 175 493 
Mackerel - 5,237 214 236 6,296 12 173 
Seer fish - 29 2 11 149 244 3 
Sciaeni ds - 126 81 1 , 839 434 54 17 
Cat fish - 30 50 729 157 102 878 
Penaeid prawns - 2 1 777 14 2 14 
Others - 966 258 3,746 1, 066 344 695 
Total - 41,202 709 7, 338 8,686 933 2,273 
No. of operations 
of units - 4 063 1 646 38 411 33 229 52,303 39 455 
19 77 
Oi l sardine 8,837 17,093 - 48 25 53 1,247 
Mackerel 12,447 2,691 1 1,344 1,193 1,146 428 
Seer fish 1 5 - 381 7 467 27 
Sciaenids - 109 4 1,076 121 135 95 
Cat fish - 14 - 1,189 24 611 434 
Penaeid prawns - 1 - 1,016 60 12 74 
Others 1 323 2,822 14 9 330 393 1 356 1,111 
To tal 22,608 22,735 19 14,384 1,823 3,780 3,416 
No . of operations 
of units 5,125 5 031 398 72 407 23 629 89 783 50 805 
1978 
Oil sardine 41,636 1 , 022 470 1 78 103 134 
Mackerel 31 , 887 7, 648 464 - 578 56 177 
Seer fish 10 2 3 1 533 157 20 
Sciaenids 2 61 338 80 58 24 59 
Cat fish 5 15 2 116 348 216 249 
Penaeid prawns - 42 180 4,453 482 14 1,207 
Others 10 225 1 560 655 13 509 1 612 250 2 863 
Total 83,765 10,350 2,112 18,160 3,689 820 4,709 
No. of operations 
of units 18 595 3,787 2 590 96 486 52,625 55 796 23 496 
Tot al 
36,153 
12,168 :. 
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2,551 
1,946 
810 
) ... 7 075 
61 ,141 
169,107 
27, 303 ~ 19 ,250 
888 
1,540 
2,272 
1,163 
16,349 
68,765 
247 178 
43,444 
40,810 
726 
622 
951 I:;; 
6,378 
30 674 
123 ,605 
253 375 
I .~ Purse-Species seine 
1979 (1st half) * 
Oil sardine 4,557 
1ackerel 6,163 
Seer fish -
Sciaenids 2 
at fish -
, fpenaeid prawns -
lathers 3,462 
ITota1 14,184 
. >~o. o f opera tions 
Iof units 6 756 
* provisional 
I 
l 
I 
~ ; 
Rampani 
-
54 
-
6 
-
1 
48 
109 
356 
Other 
shore Trawl Gill Drift 
seine net net net Others Total 
76 61 2 - - 4,696 
58 390 1,007 30 37 7 , 739 
-
- 107 124 - 231 
1 94 2 14 3 122 
- 102 38 75 24 239 
- 1,094 - - - 1 ,095 
552 3,749 215 159 28 8 ,213 
687 5,490 1,371 402 92 22,335 
720 35 089 8 687 19 183 4 , 013 74 804 
4l:14 
Tab le 2 . Landings by types of gear of marine fis h in North Kanara 
distric t or Karnat aka St ate i n In dia from 1976 t o 1979 
(Ist h alf) (i n t onne s) 
;~ Ot he r Purse Rampan i s hore Tr aw l Gill Drift Ot he rs s e ine seine net net net Species 
1976 
--
Oil sardi ne 
- 3 ,110 64 79 252 184 1 , 609 ~1ackerel 8 , 761 - 4 
- 302 16 1 , 204 Seer f ish 
- - 3 
- 538 358 4 Sci aeni ds 
- 2 139 210 88 28 198 Cat f i sh 
- 22 23 1 , 018 21 4 203 853 Penaeid prawns 
-
- 55 1 , 206 286 4 233 Ot he r s 
- 1 , 320 317 6,906 2 , 052 859 1 , 418 
Total - 13 , 215 605 9,419 3,732 1, 652 5 , 519 
No . of o~era-
tions of un its 
- 3 , 394 4 , 755 29 , 795 80 , 079 70 , 599 64 , 728 
1977 
--
Oil sardine 234 2 , 212 
- 60 14 27 2 1,050 
Mackere l 923 3 , 301 - 18 344 93 2 , 285 
See r fish 1 2 
- - 10 878 52 Sci aeni ds 2 94 33 539 24 308 222 Cat fish 
- 1 13 1,586 66 811 413 Penae i d prawns 
- 96 2 1,592 16 219 24 7 Others 6 247 80 4 , 463 837 3 , 336 1 , 385 
Tot al 1,166 5 , 953 128 8 , 258 1 , 311 5,91 7 5 , 65 4 
No . of ope ra -
tions of units 1,068 2 , 626 2 , 457 28 , 786 33,918 11, 906 25 , 412 
Tot al 
" 
5 , 298 
10 , 287 
903 
665 l 
2 , 333 
1 , 784 
12,872 
34 , 142 
253 , 350 
I" 
3,842 
6 , 96 4 
943 
1, 222 
2 , 890 
2 , 172 
10 , 354 
--I 
28 , 387 
306 , 173 
.. 
Table 2. 
~ Purse Species seine 
1978 
- -
Oil sardine 380 
Mackerel 716 
Seer f i sh -
Sciaeni ds 67 
Catfish 23 
Penaeid prawns -
Ot hers 1 , 068 
Total 2,254 
No. of opera-
tions of units 1,069 
1 
1979 (1s t h If)'' 
Oil sar di ne 3,877 
Mackerel 288 
Seer f i sh 
-
Sci aeni ds -
Cat fish 
-
Penaeid prawns 
-
Ot hers 186 
, 
Total 4,351 
i 
, No .. of opera-
tions of units 2,826 
~ 
m.a . s . 24j9 
" 
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Landings by types of gear of marine fish in North Kanara 
di s tri c t or Karnataka State i n India from 1976 to 1979 
Ost half) (in tonnes ) (cont' d.) 
Ot her 
Rampani shore Trawl Gil l Drift Others 
seine net net net 
2,268 94 1 227 131 162 
4 ,42 5 155 74 829 69 3,626 
6 3 - 53 630 45 
11 145 633 68 32 150 
62 14 269 126 450 936 
- 101 1,901 15 18 9 
241 299 6,902 783 644 394 
7,013 811 9,780 2,101 1,974 5,322 
2 ,192 3,327 31,389 74,860 82 , 106 23,762 
-
24 7 68 - 44 
1,820 62 85 307 24 311 
- - - 2 185 -
3 140 646 21 18 23 
9 2 232 44 188 76 
-
- 419 1 - 1 
128 61 3,514 223 249 101 
1 , 960 289 4,903 666 664 556 
926 1 , 411 6,072 25,547 20,310 6,466 
Total 
3 ,263 
9 ,894 
737 
1 ,106 
1 , 880 
2,044 
10,331 
29,255 
218 , 705 
4 ,020 
2 ,897 
187 
851 
551 
421 
4 , 462 
13,389 
63,558 
* pro vis ion a 1 
Table 3 
Number of Sets Made by Purse- Seine and Rampani Ne t s Dur i ng the First 
Half of 1979 and the Co r responding Per i od in 1978 
~ P-urse- seine Rampani net Period South North South North Kana ra Kanara Total Kanara Kanara Total 
January to 4,385 458 4,843 2,320 1, 445 3,765 
June 1978 
January to 6,756 2,826 9,582 356 926 1 , 282 
June 1979 
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THE PURSE SEINE FISHERY OF HONG KONG 
BASED ON AN INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN 
1975 - 1976 
by 
R. T. Chung and M.T.L. Chiu 
Fisheries Research Division 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 
Hong Kong 
Abstract 
The paper traces the history of the Hong Kong purse seine fishery 
from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s; during this time there was a 
gradual transformation from a large wind-driven fleet of vessels to a 
smaller mechanized fleet of seiners. This is basically a small boat fish -
ery which harvests various pelagic species in shallow coastal waters. 
Though there were more than 800 mechanized seiners in 1964, the fleet 
has gradually dwindled to just over 200 boats in 1974 . During the early 
days, purse seiners provided the main source of bait for long line boats. 
Today, however, the catch is used primarily by the mariculture industry 
for feed . The future of this fishery does not look particularly promising 
but suggestions are made for improvements . 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Historically , the Hong Kong purse seine fishery provided the main 
source of bait for the bottom longline fishery, and these two fisheries are 
therefore interdependent. The demand for coastal pelagic fishes for fish 
sauce manufacturing and duck raising also contributed to some extent to the 
viability of the purse seine fishery . The traditional preference for certain 
forms of sun -dried engraulids in the consumer market was also another factor 
that sustained its existence . 
Since the early fifties, the development of fish prpservat ion through 
the increasing use of ice , coupled with the development of off- shore fishing 
grounds, brought about significant increases in the proportion of fresh marine 
fish landings and an abrupt decline in the production of salt/dried f i shes . 
Subsequent changes in the Hong Kong- based fishing fleet as a result of mecha-
nisation and modernisation development programmes helped to improve the over-
all performance characteristics and gradually led the Hong Kong fisheries into 
t oday's era . 
Hithin these periods, the purse seine f ishery experienced consider-
able setbacks which resulted in a significant reduction i n the number of 
purse seine units from 2 , 049 in 1958 to 298 in 1979 (Fisheries Development 
Division, unpublished data), as well as in a rapid decline i n its viability 
during the late 1950 ' s. 
In particular, the declining trend in the s ize of the purse seine 
fleet was associated with a number of inter-related factors inherent at the 
time. The most critical event was the intensificati on in the exploitation 
rate of the bottom longline fishery , which was stimulated by the increasing 
demand for premium quality fish and made possible by the rapid development 
of the bottom longliners . Since purse seining for specific fish taxa is 
highly seasonal, the limited and sporadic supply of purse seine catches , 
particularly those of certain forms of engraulids , often resulted in high 
prices for the bait and thus increased the operational costs of bott om long-
liners. This forced the longline operators to resort to alternative bait 
from a cheaper source . At the same time, the pressing need to resolve the 
problems of the shortage of longline fishermen had led to the introduction 
of modern- hulled vessels and the "bai ting ashore" scheme. These resulted in 
a significant decrease in the operational costs of longliners through a 60- 70% 
reduction in fisherman crew and the utilisation of low- cost, readily available 
trawl fishes as a source of cheap bait . Thus, the dependence of the longline 
fishery on the purse seiners for the supply of bait gradually decreased . 
Apart from Lin (1940) and the brief accounts in the Annual Reports 
of the Director of the Agriculture and Fisheries Department s ince 1950, very 
little on the Hong Kong purse seine fishery has been documented . The most 
recent review of this fishery was made in 1972 (Fisheries Research Station, 
Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) to provide a comprehensive under-
standing of this sector of the Hong Kong fisher ies. 
Recently, the emphasis of the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 
on the development of pelagic fish resources has necessitated a general survey 
in 1975-76 of the existing purse seine fishery . 
2. METHODS 
A study of the Hong Kong purse seine fishery was initiated in November 
1975 . The waters covered were divided into six areas according to the major 
ports used by local purse seiners (Fig. 1) . Catch and effort information was 
collected in intervieHs with fishermen at the fish markets and at their home 
ports. 
Fishing was usually carried out at night. From the results of a pilot 
project, no apparent relationship could be established between total catch 
and the number of hauls made during a fishing trip (Fig. 2). Total fishing 
time for each trip, however, was relatively constant (from dusk to dawn) and 
a vessel- night is considered to be a suitable unit for fishing effort assess -
ment . The total catch per trip per vessel-night was therefore taken as the 
catch per unit of effort. The catch and effort information for each area were 
pooled to give the catch per unit of effort for that particular area . Landings 
of individual purse seiners and species composition by weight were derived 
from market sales vouchers obtainable from the Fish Marketing Organization 
(FMO), Hong Kong. 
3. THE FISHERY 
The Fishing Fleet 
The early Hong Kong purse seiners, like other· local fishing boats, 
were traditionally wind-driven . In 1948, the Government of Hong Kong ini -
tiated a mechanisation scheme for all fishing vessels and as a result, the 
number of mechanised purse seiners gradually increased. Table 1 gives the 
estimated number of purse seiners since 1951, from which it can be seen that 
the total number of local vessels engaged in purse seining declined after 
the peak year of 1957/58. This decline was caused by a reduction in the 
number of wind - driven vessels; whereas, the number of mechanised purse seiners 
continued to increase, reaching a peak in 1963/64. The wind- driven vessels 
were either mechanised during this per i od , or changed to other operations 
because they could no longer compete Hith the mechanised units . The decline 
in the number of mechanised purse seiners was first recorded in 1965, and 
following a drastic reduction in 1967, the number of purse seiners recorded 
in 1969 (425) was only 50% of that at the peak year of 1964 (856). The 
recent trend shows a further decline in the number of purse seiners and 
also the complete disappearance of wind-driven units. 
Lin (op . cit), the first to describe the Hong Kong fisheries, provides 
a comprehensive account of the purse seiners and their method of fishing . He 
recognized two types of purse seiners differing only in size : the big purse 
seiners or "pa tang" ranging 47 - 65 ft. in length, did not take part in the 
actual fishing but acted as carrier vessels for the sampans , the seine nets 
and other gear and equipment to the fishing ground ; and the smaller purse 
seiners or "Ku tsai teng" measuring 16- 2S ft. in length , were small boats 
working in pairs, from which the crew operated the net directly. 
In the present study, it has been found that except for one vessel 
with a modern-hulled design, all the purse seiners continue to retain the 
traditional Chinese junk type of hull measuring from 4 . 9 m. (16 ft.) to 
20 . 7 m. (68 ft.) LOA . 
The fish hold capacity and engine horsepower are features that limit 
the productivity of Hong Kong purse seiners. The former restricts the 
quantity of fish catches to be brought in and therefore, the total quantity 
to be harvested at times of high fish density . This is found to be directly 
proportional to the measure of capac ity (Thames tonnage x 17) used in Hong 
Kong for determining the size of a fishing vessel . Fig . 3 shows a scatter 
plot of length (LOA) against capacity for purse seiners built dur i ng 1969-
74, suggesting that length and capacity are exponentially related by the 
following equation : 
Fish hold capacity (piculs) = 0 . 0079 x K x LOA 3.010 
where K = constant 
It follows that length could be used as an index of the fish hold capacity 
of a purse seiner. 
Engine horsepower determines the speed and operat ional range of a 
purse seiner and consequently limits its capability to fish in more distant 
grounds. A plot of the length of vessel against respective engine horse-
power (Fig. 4) suggests a possible method of grouping the Hong Kong purse 
se i ners into the following classes : 
Length 
Class metre feet 
1 IS 9 . 00 30 
2 IS-lOO 9.00-13.41 30- 44 
3 100 13 . 41 44 
Justification of this classification was tested by compar i ng the 
activities of the three classes of purse se i ners with respect to their 
operational range as shown in Table 2 . It may be seen that class 1 purse 
seiners are small vessels whose fishing activities are exclusively limited 
to close proximities to their respective htme ports . Class 2 purse se i ners 
are medium - sized vessels having over 70% of their fishing activities 
conducted within the home port areas with the remainder carried out in 
areas adjacent to their home ports . Class 3 vessels are the large purse seiners 
which have the highest degree of mobility, with 33% of their fishing 
conducted in adjacent areas and 22% in waters as far afield as the Man 
Shan Islands and the Lemas (Fig . 5) . In addition, factors such as the 
skippers' knowledge of l ocal geographical and hydrological conditions 
must a lso play some part in determi ning the fishing range of these vessels . 
Gear 
A typical fishing unit consists of the mother boat and two to four 
sampans. I n general , two to four bright kerosene lights hanging from one 
or more sampans are used to a t tract fish . When a suff i cient quantity of 
fish has been concentrated , the mother boat and another sampan each working 
from different directions encircle the school with a seine net. Each purse 
seining unit carries t wo to four sets of seine nets, but some may have as 
many as eight sets . These differ in dimension and mesh size and are designed 
for catching specific species or species groups (Table 3) . To a certain 
extent , smaller vessels tend to use smaller nets for a given mesh size 
because of manpower limitations . In the case where two purse seiners ope-
rate together to form one fishing unit, bi gger nets or up t o 280 m. (15 0 fm) 
may be used . In addition, most purse seiners also carry one or two sets 
of gillnets for catching squids, and some handlines for catching Spanish 
mackerels . 
Grounds 
Most of the fishing is conducted in inshore waters between depths of 
3 .27 m (2 - 15 fm), but fishing may be extended to over 40 m. (20 fm) . Table 4 
gives the proport i on of fishing activities conducted at various depths, and 
illustrates the inshore nature of the existing purse se i ne fishery. In the 
period November 1974 to February 1975, 80% of the 387 fishing trips for which 
data are ava ilable were carried out in waters less than 18 m. (10 fm), of 
which 48% were conducted in the 11-18 m. (6-10 fm . ) range and 32% in waters 
less than 9 m. (5 fm . ) in depth. The maj or f i shi ng grounds included areas 
north and west of Cheung Chau in the west; Tai Tam Bay and Po Toi Island 
in the south ; Leung Sheung Wan, Kau Sai and Clear Water Bay in the east; and 
Tolo Harbour , Tap Mun and Ping Chau in the northeast (Fig. 1). At times, the 
large purse seiners operated in more offshore water near the Lemas and the 
Man Shan Islands (Fig . 5) . 
4 . THE RESOURCE 
Specie s 
Resources exploited by the local purse seine fishery consist largely 
of small coastal pelagic fish i ncluding mostly finf i shes and some invertebrates . 
Lin (op. cit) noted that the major taxa exploited were mackerel scads (Decap-
terus--and Trachurus spp .), pouters (Leiognathus spp . ) and some herring- like 
fishes, presumably the round herring (Dussumieria haSselti) and sardines 
( Sardinella spp . ) . 
Estimated total landings by taxa through FMO markets by the purse 
seine fleet between July 1975 and June 1976 are given in Table 5. It can 
be seen that the most important taxa by weight in descend i ng order were 
mackerel scads, sardines, gizzard shads (Clupanodon and Nematalosa spp.), 
rabbitfishes (Siganus spp . ), pouters, the shrimp scad (Caranx kalla-)-,-
mackerels (Pneumatophorus spp.), cardinal fishes (Apogon and Apogonicthys 
spp.), anchovies (Stolephorus and Engraulis spP.) and the black-finned 
scard (Caranx mate), all having estimated FMO landings exceeding 80 m. 
tons. Squids are the major invertebrate taxon landed (120 m. tons) , although 
some cuttlefishes and prawns were also caught . 
Large coastal pelagic fishes such as Spanish mackerels (Scomberomorus 
spp.) were also exploited during the peak season using hand and troll lines . 
Production 
The total annual landings by gear type for the period 1968-1978 sold 
through FMO markets are shown in Table 6 (FMO Trade Statistics) . It may be 
seen that the annual purse seine landings fluctuated between 4,000 and 5,000 
m. tons in 1973 and 1974 respectively (rMO Trade Statistics) , while total 
landings by all gear types for the same period remained fairly constant at 
75 thousand m. tons. 
However, FMO landing figures for purse seiners are und e r - estimates 
of the true annual landings by this gear as it is known that significant 
proportions of purse seine catches are sold outside FMO markets . Estimated 
landing figures for purse seiners in fact showed a continual and sizeable 
decline from 17,000 m. tons in 1976 to only 6,000 m. tons in 1978 (Table 6) . 
The decline in the number of purse seiners together with natural fluctuation 
in the resources must be responsible for this decrease in landings . In 
addit ion, losses due to spoilage including that incurred during the sun-
drying process, which might involve the whole catch dur i ng bad weather, were 
again not included. 
Seasonal trend 
Rwse seining activities are particularly sensitive to weather condi-
tions compared with o ther gears . The activities of a number of purse seiners 
based at Stanley were closely f ollowed during the period of study to estimate 
t heir fishing intensity (Table 7) . It may be seen that fishing activity was , 
in general, low throughout the winter period due to the prevailing northeast 
monsoon but was generally higher for other seasons. This agre es with the 
pattern of distr ibution of the computed monthly fish i ng effort based on market 
landing figures and interview data (Table 8) . 
This dependence of fishing activity on local weather condit ions has 
contributed to s easonal var iations in the landings by purse seiners. From 
the monthly FMO purse seine landings for 1972 to 1974 (Fig. 6) , it can be shown 
that the peak season of purse seine catches falls in the summer months~ Mini-
mum landings were consistently recorded in February due partly to poor weather 
conditions in this month and to the celebrat i on of the Lunar New Year i n port 
by the fisherman. 
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However, the ava i lability of a species t o the fishery must also be 
governed by its life cycle and the influence of environmental factors on 
reproduction, growth , feeding and migration. The monthly catch per unit of 
effort for the major taxa computed from market interviews and sales voucher 
processing is graphically presented in Fig . 7 to illustrate the seasonal 
abundance of the resource . It may be seen that catch per unit of effort 
for all fin fish species peaks in August and September 1975 and June 1976. 
The high catches in August and September resulted from a high abundance of 
Sardinella spp . and Decapterus spp ., and to a lesser extent of Caranx kalla. 
The peak in June was attributed to high catches of the mackerel scads (Decap-
terus and Trachurus spp .). The occurrence of other taxa such as that of the 
anchovies, the finlet scads (Caranx mate and the cardinal fishes also showed 
fairly distinct but lesser peaks lasting for one to two months; whereas, t he 
gizzard shads (Clupanodon and Nematalosa spp.), rabbitfishes (Siganus spp.) 
pouters (Leiognathus ~.) and mackerels TPlleumatophorous spp.) had lower but 
extended peak occurrences of several months. 
5. DISCUSSION 
Despite relatively stable purse seiner landings through FM O markets 
for the period 1974 to 1978, estimated total annual landings by purse seiners , 
also taking into account landings outside FM O markets , showed a continual and 
sizeable decline from 17 thousand m. tons in 1976 to 6 thousand m. tons in 
1978 (Table 6). The estimated number of purse seiners also declined from 
385 in 1976 to 298 in 1979 . Thus, apart from natural fluctuations in the 
resources , the decline in total landings must be partly attributed to a 
decrease in the size of the purse sei ne fleet. 
A diminishing fleet size, apart from other reasons , suggests unattrac-
tive financial return for this part icular gear . Although cost-earnings 
studies of the purse seine fishery have not been conducted , detailed discussions 
with purse seine fishermen have revealed that the profit margin for this 
sector ~f the Hong Kong fisheries has remained low due to the relatively 
low market price for the catch compared with that for the other f isheries . 
The FMO figures show that the average price for purse s eine catches are always 
considerably lower than that for the other gear (Table 9). 
The low market value of purse seine landings indicate the low demand 
for the products resulting from the limited market for the species. As a 
rule, purse seine catches comprise almost exclusively small, bony pelagic 
fishes which are traditionally much less preferred as food f i shes by the 
consumers . Certain taxa such as the squids and anchovies do fetch a reason-
able price both in the fresh or dried state as these are among the preferred 
food items. However, in the case of the dried anchovies, market saturation 
often results duri ng the peak season, resulting in a collapse of the price 
from about US$5 to only US$1.20 per kg . within one to two months. When this 
happens, purse seine fishermen tend to restrain their fishing effort by 
staying in port . 
A sizeable proportion of the catch is utilized as feed for the culture 
of marine fish and the farming of ducks . The recent expansion of marine fish 
farming necessitates additional supplies of fish as feed . In this respect, 
however, the purse seiners are presently facing keen competition from the trawl 
sector bringing in trash fish that were previously discarded . 
Similarly, trawlers compete with the purse seiners for the supply of 
bait for the bottom longline fishery . Except for pe lagic species almost exclu-
sively exploited by purse seining, other bait species such as the mackerel 
scads are also caught in quantity by trawlers . The development of the h igh 
opening trawl enables trawlers to catch a higher proport i on of off-bottom 
species , including squids and mackerel scad~ thus increasing the supply 
of these species as bait for the longl i ners. The decline of the longline 
fleet in recent years has resulted in a reduction in the demand for bait and 
creates further constraints on the purse seine fishery. 
Purse seine catches are also utilised for the manufacture of f ish sauce 
and fish meal . However, the seasonal nature of the resource and the relatively 
l ow current annual landings do not justify large-scale development of these 
activities and thus fail to secure the possibi lity of bulk utilisation of the 
purse seine catches . 
The decreasing landings may also be the result of t he limited fish 
stocks in existing purse seining grounds . Although little information is 
available to illustrate a lower fish abundance, the loss of purse seining 
grounds due to land development in recent years is quite apparent . Reclama-
tion in the Tolo area and the construction of the High Island Reservoir in 
the Sai Kung area are notable examples of the physical loss of purse seining 
grounds . The lowering of stock abundance in tradit i onal fishing grounds due 
t o deterioration of the environment is less apparent but is not to be over-
looked. Purse seine fishermen have attributed the decreasi ng abundance of 
some pelagic species in certa i n areas to contamination of the environment 
by various types of marine dumping and land-based discharge. 
The high sensi tivity of the purse seiners to changes in local weather 
and sea conditions means that they can fish effectively for much shorter 
periods during the main season than, say , trawlers . This, together with the 
relative inefficiency of the fishing operation in terms of manpower utilisa-
tion, contributes to the lower economic return for this gear . 
With increasing job opportunities on shore , fishermen of the younger 
generation are always tempted to leave the fishing industry to take up jobs 
in other industries . Although this situation is not unique to the purse 
seine fishery, it is however more acute in view of t he lower pr i ce realised 
for the purse seiner catches and hence the less attractive income for the 
purse seine fishermen compared with that in other sub- sectors of the fishing 
industry . Purse se i ning is a l abour - intensive gear as shooting and hauling 
are all done by hand . The average crew size of a purse seiner is comparable 
to that of the larger stern trawlers, gill netters or longliners . Thus the 
effects of labour shortage are felt more severely in the purse seining fish -
ery than in other sub- sectors. 
To maintain the competitiveness of the purse seiners in the fish 
industry, it is necessary to work in three directions, viz to cut operational 
cost, to increase catches and t o stimulate demand for the catch. Cutting 
operational cost could be achieved through mechanisation of the fishing 
operation whereby the number of crew required can be minimised. Increased 
catch can be achieved by improving methods of concentrating and catching the 
fish. For the latter aspect, electric bright lights for attracting pelagic 
fishes have been tested'by the Fisheries Development Division although 
conclusive results still await further experimentation. An area of develop-
ment towards higher demand for the catch is to improve utilisation. In this 
respect, the Fisheries Development Division has been looking into the feasi-
bility of making silage from trash fish and of utilising this silage as an 
additive to pig feed and fish pellets. 
Faced with increasing running costs, shortage of labour, low utilisa-
tion and low market price for their catch, the outlook for the purse seiners 
is not bright. It is also unlikely that the existing fleet will be able to 
take advantage of the location of offshore pelagic resources which is being 
given priority in the Fisheries Branch of the Agriculture and Fisheries 
Department , as it is likely that new types of vessels and new technology 
will be required for the exploitation of these new resources. The involve-
ment of local purse seiners in the mariculture industry is at present the 
only incentive for them to stay in the purse seining business. The present 
estimated annual production of the mariculture industry is 630 m. t onnes. 
Taking a conversion ratio of 10 :1, a t otal of 6,3 00 tons of trash fish 
would be required as feed for this crop and purse seiners currently provide 
the bulk of this amount. It has been noted that in Stanley where no mari -
culture is practised because of geographical limitations, the once active 
and sizeable purse seine fleet based there is now almost non- existent. Purse 
seining has today evolved into a part-time operation associated with mari -
culture and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. 
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Table 1. The estimated numbers of purse - sei ners, 1951-1974 
Year Purse Seiners Total 
Wind - driven Mechanised 
1951 '" 1811 - 1811 
1952 '" 1687 2 1689 
1953'" 1695 13 1708 
1954 ~' 1673 121 1794 
1 955~' 1568 253 1821 
1956~' 1604 305 1 909 
1957* 1496 466 1962 
1958 ", 1254 695 1949 
1959~' 1051 702 1753 
1 960'" 933 723 1656 
1961'" 808 739 1547 
1962;' 557 811 1368 
1963;' 489 842 1331 
1964;' 428 856 1284 
1965 ~' - 833 833 
1966~' 264 803 1067 
1967* 234 592 826 
1968" - - -
1969~' 103 425 528 
1973;';' 25 340 365 
1974 - 228 228 
~, date extracted from IPFC /72/SYM 46. 
,',,', estimation by the Fisheries Development Division 
Table 2 . Fishing range of purse seiners categorised by engine hor sepower 
Vessels Fishing at Total no . 
categorised Home port at"ea Adjacent areas Other areas of tt"ips by H. P . 
No . of trips(n) % No . of t r i ps ( n ) % No. of trips( n) % n 
Class 1 18 30 100 / / / / 30 
Class 2 18-100 96 73 . 28 35 26 . 72 / / 131 
Class 3 100 4 Lj Lj • Lj Lj 3 33 .33 2 22 . 22 9 
Total 130 76.47 38 22 . 35 2 1.18 170 
Table 3 . Dimens ions and me s h sizes of seine nets us ed by local purse seiners . 
Length Depth Mesh Spec i es of groups 
(metres ) ( Chinese ) (metres ) (Chinese) (mm. ) ( Chinese ) caught 
( fms ) ( f ms ) (in) 
20-50 12-30 11 . 7-16 . 7 7-10 5 . 50-7 . 50 0 .15-0.20 post larval stages of anc hovies 
50-83.5 30-50 26 . 7-50 16- 30 9 . 30-11. 20 0 . 25-0 .30 small anchovy, anc hovy-like species , 
juvenile sardines , juvenile scad 
83 . 5-116 . 9 50-70 41. 8-66 . 8 25-40 11.20- 22 . 30 0 . 30-0 . 60 sardines, small scad , j uvenile 
mackerel, large s i ze anchovies 
100. 2-250.5 60-150 40-116.9 24-70 22 . 30-44. 60 0.60- 1. 20 sard ine , scad, pouters, gizzard 
shad , mullet, other carangids , 
rabbi t fish 
~ 
~ 
-> 
Table 4. The proportion of purse seine: fishing conducted at 
various depth ranges over the period November 1974 
to February 1975 inclusive 
Depth range Fishing activity 
(metres) (fathom) No. of trips % of total 
9.1 5 123 31. 78 
11- 18.3 6- 10 186 48.06 
20.1- 27 .4 11- 15 65 16.80 
over 27 .4 over 15 13 3 . 36 
Total 387 100 
I , 
! 
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Table 5 . Species composltlon by weight (rn . tons) by area for purse seiner 
landings according to FMO auct i on vouchers f or the period 
July 1975 - June 1976 
~ Spec les 
<Stolephorus/Engraulis spp . 
· Apogon spp . 
Caranx ~ 
Clupanodon/Nematolosa spp . 
Leiognathus brevirostris 
Leiognathus spp . 
· Mugil cephalus 
Mug il spp . 
Pneumatophorus japon icus 
Sardinella spp . 
Decapterus spp . 
Siganus spp . 
Trich i urus spp . 
Dussumieria hasseltii 
J Sphyraena spp . 
• Thrissa spp . 
Caranx kalla 
Hemirhamphidae 
Selaroides lepitolepis 
Spar i dae 
Therapon spp . 
Atherina spp . 
Caranx malabar ic us 
Chirocentrus darab 
Rastrelliger spp . 
Monocanthus spp . 
Stromateoides spp . 
Thunnidae 
Gerres spp . 
Atropus atropus 
Fish larvae 
Unsorted fish spp . 
Squid 
Cuttle 
Octopus 
Shrimp 
Vertebrate subtotal 
Invertebrate subtotal 
Gross total landings 
1 
53.84 
1.49 
58 . 45 
3.34 
18 . 87 
8 . 51 
7 . 04 
8 . 16 
20 . 99 
274 . 76 
128.65 
28.86 
3 . 00 
7 . 66 
1. 31 
0 . 46 
17 . 36 
0 . 33 
1. 03 
0 . 39 
0 . 22 
6 . 69 
0 . 34 
3 . 82 
0 . 14 
0 . 16 
0 . 29 
0 . 03 
0 . 01 
44 . 70 
35 . 75 
2 . 12 
0 . 05 
0 . 40 
700 . 91 
38 . 32 
739 . 23 
2 
31. 90 
9 . 08 
8 . 01 
260 .25 
135.00 
32 .32 
22.13 
24 . 32 
448 .54 
179 . 31 
162 . 91 
3 . 14 
1. 90 
1.33 
23 . 58 
182 . 36 
0 . 10 
3 . 85 
1. 91 
1. 23 
0 . 02 
0 . 99 
0 . 98 
5.15 
0 . 03 
1.14 
7 . 99 
0 . 08 
319 . 67 
15 . 06 
1.66 
0 . 60 
1869.25 
17 .31 
1886.56 
3 
1. 71 
13.04 
7 . 07 
9.15 
5 . 41 
8 . 70 
18 . 06 
60 . 85 
156.47 
25 . 00 
1. 86 
2 . 19 
0 . 33 
0 .15 
2 . 81 
0 . 86 
1.19 
2 . 59 
0 . 32 
0 . 02 
1. 08 
0 . 40 
2 . 45 
3 . 06 
60 . 66 
39 . 38 
0 . 38 
0 . 02 
385 . 42 
39 . 78 
425 . 20 
4 
5.31 
45 . 87 
4.94 
2.99 
24.98 
11.80 
5 . 82 
53 . 10 
32 . 77 
75 . 28 
10 . 35 
1. 50 
0 . 13 
1. 31 
8.34 
0 . 95 
2 . 25 
0 . 01 
0.04 
0.12 
0 . 04 
0 .43 
3 . 40 
6.96 
0.03 
292 . 77 
69 . 78 
352 . 55 
5 
9 . 58 
69.84 
3 . 09 
0 .48 
48 . 04 
62 . 53 
3 . 01 
36 . 81 
30 . 86 
50 . 60 
888.25 
30 . 49 
0 . 49 
9.61 
0 . 04 
0 . 08 
0 . 92 
5 . 09 
1. 24 
4 . 41 
0 . 02 
31. 75 
0 . 11 
0 . 06 
0.32 
13 . 44 
24.55 
0.98 
27 . 38 
1301. 26 
53.01 
1354 . 27 
Total 
102 . 44 
125.29 
82 . 59 
276 . 08 
214 . 04 
95 . 02 
59 . 58 
81. 61 
147 . 34 
867 . 52 
1428 . 97 
257.62 
9 . 99 
21.48 
3 . 01 
25 . 43 
208 . 99 
5.54 
7 . 69 
5 . 69 
2 . 65 
5 . 71 
8 . 34 
5 .17 
5.31 
31. 75 
1. 34 
1. 30 
8 . 74 
2 . 92 
3 .5 0 
441. 87 
121.79 
5 .17 
0 . 05 
28.40 
4549 .60 
115 . 41 
4665.01 
Trawler 
Liners 
Gill-netters 
Purse seiners 
Others 
Imported 
Total 
Table 6. Landings of fresh marine fish and invertebrates sold through all FMO 
markets, c l assified by gear type 
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m ' 000 m 
tons tons tons tons tons tons tons tons tons 
38 . 6 lj5 . 6 48 . 5 48 . 0 48 . 3 50.5 51. 1 55.5 61.1 
13.3 13.0 10.9 10.4 10.0 8 . 2 9 . 3 8 . 7 8 . 7 
6.2 5 . 7 5 . 5 5 . 7 7 . 0 8 . 3 10 . 4 12 . 3 12 . 2 
5 . 2 4 . 2 5 . 1 4 . 5 4 . 5 2.9 3.2 3 . 8 4 . 7 12 . 9'" 13.1'"' 17 . 0;' 
3 . 4 4.0 3 . 7 3 . 4 4 . 0 4 . 5 4.6 ll . 7 1.6 
1.2 1.8 2 . 1 1.8 1.3 1.4 1.5 0 . 9 0 . 8 
6 . 74 . 3 75. 73 . 75 . 0 75 . 8 80 . 1 85 . 9 89 . 1 
1977 
' 000 m 
tons 
62 . 1 
8 . 2 
10.8 
ll.3 
11. 4;' 
1. 1 
0 . 5 
8 . 
,', Estimated total landings (including landings outside FMO) by Economic Division, A & F D. 
1978 
' 000 m 
tons 
64 . 8 
7.0 
10.7 
3 . 0 
6.3" 
1.8 
0 . 3 
87 . 
I 
~ 
0' 
o 
4 51 
Table 7 . Intensity of f i shing activit ie s for purse seiners based 
at Stanley (December 1974 to November 1975) 
Month 
December 1974 
January 1975 
February 
March 
April 
May 
June 
July 
August 
September 
"October 
November 
Sample 
size 
(no. of vessels) 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
5 
4 
5 
2 
Total no. 
of nights 
fished 
71 
97 
33 
94 
109 
86 
91 
136 
69 
46 
27 
28 
% vessel 
nights 
fished 
38.17 
52.15 
23.57 
60.65 
72.67 
55 . 48 
60 . 67 
73.12 
44.52 
38 . 33 
17.42 
46.67 
;, fishing affected by typhoon during that period 
Table 8 . Monthly estimated fishing effort (trips) for purse seiners 
by area from Jul y 1975 to June 1976 
Area 
Estimated 1 2 3 4 5 All areas effort 
~ Month 
July 1975 560 349 612 194 79 1 794 
August 354 435 433 150 500 1 872 
Se ptember 324 385 564 205 541 2 019 
October 228 628 146 180 307 1 4 89 
November 144 559 49 129 176 1 057 
December 128 316 55 164 50 713 
January 1976 128 368 89 53 118 756 
February 277 190 117 66 31 681 
,March 182 227 313 79 355 1 156 
April 231 131 364 233 426 1 385 
May 186 406 259 228 450 1 529 
June 380 308 228 152 648 1 716 
3 122 4 302 3 229 1 833 3 681 16 167 
• 
, 
453 
Table 9. Average price (HK$) per kg. by gear type of catches 
sold through r.M.O. markets 
~gear 
Year -........ ........ 
. ~ 
Trawl Gillnetter Longliner Purse seiner Other gears 
1974 2.02 3.74 4.48 1.17 2 . 96 
1975 1. 93 3.60 5.24 1.06 3.06 
1976 2.13 3.92 6.02 1.21 3.49 
1977 2 . 73 5.06 7.14 1. 57 4.12 
Stern 4.32 
trawl 
1978 5 . 44 7.80 1. 93 4.18 
Pair 2.55 trawl 
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Abstract 
The fishery of Sri Lanka is essentially a small- scale fishery, com-
prised of four sectors: the private sector, the state sector, the corpo-
ration sector and the cooperative sector. Sri Lanka has had the unique 
experience-of fish marketing being undertaken by all of these four sectors . 
Fish marketing which was traditionally in the hands of the private sector 
was attempted on a country- wide scale by the government , cooperatives and 
corporations, in that order . None of these sectors could match the effi-
ciency of the private sector. While the attempts of the government and 
the corporations resulted in a loss , the cooperative sector operation was 
able to show a semblance of a profit. In a small -scale fishery l ike that 
of Sri Lanka, marketing of fish on a more localized basis is a hazardous 
enterprise because distance and time are so important . In the Sri Lanka 
context, free markets distribute a highly perishable and unpredictable 
commodity like fish more efficiently than government bureaucracies do. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
FAO has defined a small- scale f ishery in the following terms. 
"Small-scale fisheries are labour intensive and are conducted by artisanal 
craftsmen whose level of income, mechanical sophistication, quantity of 
production, fishing range, political influence, market outlets, employment 
and social mobility and financial dependence keep them subservient t o the 
economic decisions and operating constraints placed upon them by those who 
buy their production"!/ . By this definition or indeed, by any other defi-
nition, the fisheries of Sri Lanka can truly be described as small- scale 
fisheries. This is slightly more true of the production aspect of the 
fisheries than of the marketing aspect. Whereas 97% of the production is 
by small-scale fishermen and 3% is by medium scale operations, 93% is 
marketed by small time traders and 7% by centrally controlled institutions 
and entrepreneurial enterprises. (Vide page 23 , Table 2 for Fishery Rela-
ted Statistics). 
This paper attempts to describe various approaches to the market-
ing of fish on a country-wide scale and the lessons to be learned from 
the experience of the different approaches. 
This experience of Sri Lanka is perhaps unique in that fish has 
been marketed on a country-wide basis by three of the four sectors that 
comprise its economy. Fish marketing which was traditionally in the 
exclusive hands of the private sector was attempted on a country-wide basis 
by the state sector, the cooperative sector and the corporation sector . 
The - four sectors which compri s e the economy of Sri Lanka are : 
Public Sector Non-Public Sector 
(a) State sector (c) Private sector 
(b) Corporation sector (d) Cooperative sector 
(a) The private sector contributes about 50% to the GDP~/. The 
role of the private sector has progressively diminished with the corpora-
tion sector moving into the socially sensitive areas of goods and services. 
(b) The state sector contributes about 20% to the GDP. This sector 
comprises government departments and is predominant in the communications 
sector. 
(c) The corporation sector contributes about 25% to the GDP. This 
sector comprises statutory boards and corporations in which the government 
1/ Expert Consultation on Small-Scale Fisheries Development, FAO Fisheries 
Report No. 169, FAO, Rome, 1975. 
2/ GDP = Gross Domestic Product. Vide page 21 for Selected Economic Indi-
cators . (Table 1) . 
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is the only shareholder . Management is in the hands of a Board of Directors 
appointed by the Mi nister and answerable to him and through him to Parliament. 
(d) The cooperative sector's contribution to the GDP is negligible. 
However it dominates the food distribution sector and has , by far, the 
largest distribution network, some 2 000 sales points, in the nature of 
cooperative stores - that is to say one per 7 000 people . These sales 
points are the channe~for selling rationed and/or subsidized commodities. 
Although the policy of successive governments has been to retain the 
commanding heights of the economy in the public sector, the private sector 
is still the predominant sector~ 
Fish constitutes an important i ngredient in the diet of the nation . 
Thi s is evident from Tabl e 3 . Fish as a source of an i mal protein is neces -
sary for those of the Buddhi st and Hindu religious persuasions who comprise 
85% of the population , because eating of beef and eggs is either taboo or 
not favoured. This cast s a burden on t he s t ate t o make fish available at 
reasonable pri ces . Thus successive governments have not been content to 
allow t he marketing of fish to remain exclusively in the hands of the private 
sector. 
In this paper marketing of fish refers to the procurement of supplies , 
i ts transport, storage and sale to the consumer . Vide maps 2, 3 and 4. 
The sectors of the economy involved in the marketing of fish placed 
in a simple time - frame are: 
1/ 
Period 
Up to 1943 
1944 to 1952 
1952 t o 1964 
1965 to date 
Sectors 
Private sector 
State sector 
Corporation sector 
Cooperative sector 
Gross 
Capital 
1965 
Agency /Agencies 
The private sector 
The private sector and the 
government Department of 
Fisheries (Fisheries 
Department) 
The private sector and the 
Ceyl on Cooperative Fish 
Sales Union (Cooperative 
Union) 
The private sector and the 
Ceylon Fisheries Corpora-
t i on 
Domestic Sectoral Estimates 
Formation of Employment 
to 1975 1975 
55% 1 110 000 
25% 424 000 
18% 484 000 
2% 64 000 
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It will be noted that the entry by the state, cooperative and cor-
poration sectors into the area of fish marketing did not result in the 
exclusion of the private operation. They co- existed and competed with each 
other. There was no national i zation of fish marketing . Fish marketing was 
not an area reserved for any part i cular sector of the economy. However, 
there is no gainsaying the fact that the clout derived by the other sectors 
from government patronage put them at some advantage over the private sector. 
2. THE FISHERIES PRIVATE SECTOR OPERATION 
The fishing industry was a function of the museum administration 
and looked after by the marine biologist till 1939 . In 1940 a post of 
Assistant Director of Fisheries was created in the museum cadres . In 1941, 
the Department of Fisheries came into being . It appears that until 1941 the 
development of the industry was not subject to any direction or impetus by 
the government. There was also no entrepreneurial investment in the fish -
ing industry though many had grown to entrepreneurial status from very small 
beginnings within the industry . 
The private sector operation 
The marketing channels of the private sector operation are depicted 
in Sketches 1, 2, 3 and 4 . About 75% of the fisherman's catch is routed 
through the channels depicted in Sketches 1 and 2 . The route shown in Sketch 
2 is of recent development and is s ignificant in that it has eliminated one 
middleman. With transport and ice supplies being more freely available, 
fishermen are increasingly packing their catch themselves and consigning 
it to the metropolitan and/or inland wholesaler, thus bypassing the coastal 
wholesaler. The channel at Sketch 3, never of much significance, is grad-
ually dying out, for as is to be expected, succeeding generations of fisher -
men did not want their wives to hang around the beach awaiting their husbands' 
return from fishing and then hang around in the selling places, disposing of 
the catch or part of it. 
Disposal at each link of the chain 
A. Disposal by the fisherman 
He can dispose of fish in one of three ways : 
(i) By sale at contracted, that is to say, pre-negotiated prices 
to the coastal consignor. Sale is by weight. As soon as his craft is 
beached, the coastal consignor or his representative will arrive with a 
weighing scale - usually rigged - weigh and take over the catch. A receipt 
is issued. Payment is made weekly after the coastal consignor receives pay-
ment for his consignments from the metropolitan or inland wholesaler. 
Generally, it is the fishermen indebted to or financed by coastal consignors 
who have to sell their catch in this manner. 
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(ii) By auction at the landing point or in an auction shed. Pay-
ment is made at once, the next day or weekly . Except where payment is made 
on the spot, there is no guarantee that settlement is made at the bid 
price. At the time of settlement some arbitrary reduction is made . Not -
withstanding this infirmity, the element of competitive bidding, inherent 
in the auction system, gives t he fisherman a price commensurate with the 
supply and demand fo~ the day. 
(iii) By consigning his catch himself, direct to the metropolitan 
or inland wholesaler. This can be done only where ice is freely available 
and a regular transport service ope rates. In this way, the fisherman eli-
minates the profits of the middleman coastal consignor. This is not an 
island- wide phenomena. It has developed only in North Sri Lanka. However , 
it is a development devoutly to be wished for. In these areas, the ousted 
coastal consignor has switched to supplying ice to the fisherman and 
transporting his consignments. He is thus still in business but exercises 
less of a strangle- hold on the fisherman in his new role. 
B. Disposal by the metropolitan wholesalers 
The wholesale market in the metropolis, Colombo, is the only whole -
sale market in Sri Lanka in the true sense of the word. Fish consigned to 
wholesalers are packed in timber boxes, with crushed ice, 22 kg fish to a 
box and transported by trucks, 200 boxes to a truck if fully loaded. 
These trucks leave the fishing areas at dusk and travelling overnight 
converge on the metropolitan wholesale market at dawn. The wholesale mar-
ket comes alive with the arrival of the f irst consignments. With the 
arrival of the first few trucks and knowledge of the quantities brought in 
them the wholesaler can make a shrewd forecast of the supply position for 
the day and one of the market leaders establishes a price which is followed. 
The truck drivers provide the market intelligence of the day's landings in 
their areas. With the arrival of the last trucks, the supply position for 
the day crystalizes and the price stabilizes. Till then, prices change 
with the arrival of consignments. A change in price by one market leader 
is followed by the others. 
In these wholesale markets the fish is put up for sale, a few 
boxes at a time . Fish is weighed and sold in toto or in round form, that 
is to say without cutting, in quantities to suit the smallest retailer . A 
consignor consigns to more than one wholesaler. There is thus a healthy 
competition among the wholesalers to return the best price to his consignor 
because his future supplies will depend on his present performance. A 
wholesaler who consistently returns poor prices and weights will be starved 
of supplies and eased out of the market. This built-in i nsurance protects 
the consignor who after all, consigns without elaborate documentation or 
security. The wholesale activity is over in a few hours, generally lasting 
from 5 a.m. to 10 a.m. Speedy disposal is the essence of this operation. 
Fish is not stored for sale the next day except in situations of extreme 
glut. Such occasions are few and far between. The wholesalers advance 
monies to the ccnsignors who in turn have to give advances to fishermen to 
obtain their catch. 
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These wholesalers sell to: 
(i) city retailers, who have fish stalls in the various local 
authority markets . 
(ii) vendors , who hawk their fish in head loads, pi ngos, or 
bicycles to various parts of the city and its suburbs. 
(iii) retailers who use vans to take their fish to suburban mar-
kets and fa irs . 
(iv) institutional buyers who are on contract to supply the bi gger 
hotels, restaurants , schools , nursing homes , etc . 
(v) proprietors of smaller hotels , restaurants , eating houses , 
hostels , etc . , who are their own buying agents . 
(vi) shipchandlers . 
C. Disposal by the retailers 
The throughput of the city reta iler varies from 100 to 200 ki l ograms 
depending on the size of his clientele . He f ixes his retail price on the 
price at which he procured his supplies at the wholesale market . He has 
the decision making authority to drop his price to dispose of the day's 
stocks . If he is still unable to dispose of the day ' s stocks , it is iced 
and sold the next day . The output of t he itinerant vendor, who goes from 
house to house , does not exceed 15 ki lograms . Each has hi s beat. The 
small turnover postulates a hi gh profit margin per kilogram . Th i s i s 
therefore a high cost method of sale. However, t hese itinerant vendors 
render a very personalized service to their customers. They vary prices 
to ensure that all their stocks are sold on t he same day . The smalle r 
restaurants and eating houses have a f ixed budget for each day ' s purchases 
of fish. The amount r emains fixed whatever the fluctuations in t he price 
of fish . Their commitment is to buy so many pieces of f ish for a f i xed 
allocation of money . The allocation be ing fixed, the size of each piece 
served i s in di rect proportion to the day 's price of f i sh . A rise in the 
price therefore gets passed on to the consumer who eats in his hotel, 
restaurant or hostel . 
The risk element in the chain 
The risk areas in the marketing chain are indi cated in t he sketches 
with question marks . The greatest risk is t aken by the coastal consignor 
who buys at contracted fixed prices . He is committed to buy the entire 
catch at the contracted prices . If the net - back from his consignees -
the wholesalers - is lower than the price he paid, he stands to l ose . He 
who buys at the auctions also runs a risk but to a lesser extent because 
he can control the quantit ies he buys . 
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An element of risk also attaches to the retailers, including the 
vendors, in that they have on occasions to sell below their cost to dis-
pose of their stocks, because they are hardly geared to storing fish 
overnight , and in any event are not accustomed to doing $0 . 
It will be noted that there is no financ ial risk attached to the 
operations of the metropolitan wholesaler . He operates on a commission 
basis and whatever the price , he is assured of his commission. He oper-
ates on about a 10% commission . When supplies are meagre his turnover, 
quantity-wise declines but this was compensated for by an increase in unit 
price which leads to increased value t urnover . 
The performance of the private sector 
Until the Department of Fisheries entered the f ield of marketing 
in 1943 , the production, transport and sale of fish was entirely in the 
hands of the private sector . As stated earlier, the private sector, was 
composed of small timers, who operated proprietorships . There were no 
companies or partnerships. By and large they were not educated and depended 
on lowly paid clerks to keep some basic books and records. Time was when the con-
signor in the fishing village, the retailer in the city markets and the 
itinerant vendor were the local bullies. Hence the consumer was always 
wary of his transactions with them. The deal was always suspect. The 
• laws of supply and demand were very much in operation and fish pr i ces 
fluctuated wildly upsetting the housewife's budget . 
Each coastal consignor and indee d , each retailer, confi ned himself 
to a limited area. There was no attempt to expand into unfamiliar areas. 
Achievements of t he private sector operat i on 
(a) Credit was and is provided to the fisherman for his fishing 
operations , his subsistence and social needs, albeit on usurious terms, 
, when neither government nor other financial i nstitutions were prepared to 
finance or risk financing fishing operations of the fisherman . 
• (b) Quick disposal was the essence of the.operation. 
which increases losses from shrinkage, pilferage and spoilage 
adds to cost and was therefore avoided. 
Storage, 
inexorably 
(c) There was a personal association between the people involved 
built on trust . Documentation was therefore reduced to the bare minimum. 
(d) The participants in the various transactions were themselves 
the dec i sion makers . 
(e) There were no clock watchers anywhere in the entire operation. 
Working hours were arduous and unsocial . Supplies being of an unpredict -
able nature , periods of intense act i vity were interspersed with periods of 
inactivity wh i ch somewhat compensated for the unsocial hours . 
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(f) At most stages of the chain of transactions , title in the 
to the transact ors so that each had a financial stake 
him to dispose of his product expeditiously , efficient l y 
He was also compelled to maintain good relations with 
he bought and those to whom he sold. The servi ce to the 
a high order. 
product, passed 
which compelled 
and profitably . 
those from whom 
customer was of 
(g) All the fish produced ultimately reached the consumer in the 
fresh or cured form . There was no undue wastage and spoilage arising from 
bad handling, irresponsibility and absenteeism. 
(h) The operation was efficient and did not countenance t he lethar-
gic and dUll-witted . Astute persons gathered i mpressive fortunes . 
Weaknesses of the private sector operation 
(a) The private sector operation remained in the hands of small 
timers who operated as ind i viduals . There was no attempt to pool resources 
or know-how to form companies. Thus the scale of operations remained small . 
The form of organization tended to inhibit change . 
It also inhibited development of technology and techniques . 
By that same token there was no innovation . The same methods of fishing, 
fish handli ng, storage and marketing were perpetuated . 
This also inhibited financial institutions from funding the 
industry . funds were raised from the traditional sources in the tradi-
tional way , by unsecured loans obtained on trust, by mortgaging immovables 
and movables, especially jewelry . 
(b) The entrepreneurial class was not attracted to an industry 
which was considered a high-risk industry . 
(c) Manageri al and technical skills were not attracted to the 
industry because of a reluctance to be employees of an indivi dual . Hence 
concepts of quality control, hygiene, packaging , etc. did not develop. 
(d) Since storage in times of glut was abhorred , prices fluctuated 
wildly to the discomfiture of the producer, the consumer and the government. 
(e) In areas where the roads were bad and there was no competitive 
buyi ng, fishermen were exploited and their catch bought for a song . 
(f) Because the wholesaler was always bent on returning the best 
possible price to his consignor, he did not hesitate t o dispose of fish of 
a doubtful quality . 
3. THE DEPARTMENT Of fISHERIES OPERATI ON 
The function of fisheries was separated from the museum adminis-
tration, when the Department of fisheries was established on January 17th 
1941 and was allotted to the Ministry of Local Government (See fig . 1). 
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With the gainin g of Independence in 1948 a Cabinet form of government 
replaced the Executive Committee form and the function of fisheries was 
allotted to the ~linistry of Industries.!}. (See Fig. 2) . 
Fish marketing by the Department of Fisheries 
Shortages of food arising from disorganizat ion in shipping during 
World Har II, when rationing and price controls were the order of the day , 
i nduced the government to make fish available to the populace at reasonable 
prices. The government introduced price control of fish and to make price 
control more of a reality to the consumer the Department of Fisheries entered 
the arena of fish marketing . It is claimed that at that time, 1944, that 
this was only the second instance of a government department engaging in 
fish marketing~. The channels used by the Department are in Figure 3 . 
The Department of Fisheries was in trouble from the start. To achieve 
the objective of making fish available at controlled prices, it had to become 
the market leader and thereby the price leader. To do this it had to have a 
fair share of the market. The Department did not get adequate supplies to 
make an impact on the market and the price of fish. (See Table 14). 
It was not easy to break the stranglehold the coastal cons i gnor had 
on the fisherman . The link between the fisherman and the coast a l consignor 
was a personal one . Apart from financing the f ishing operat ion and taking 
over the marketing function from the fisherman, these cons i gnors were fr iends-
in- need. He was of the fishing village or a man of the area restricting his 
operations to his home grounds, except where the fishermen of his area migra-
ted to other f i shing grounds . Officials of the Fisheries Department who had 
to occupy his shoes to obtain supplies of fish were transferable officers 
and could well have been of a different race and/or religion. The coastal 
consignor helped the fisherman with loans, transport, etc. for their social 
functions and funerals . This is a service t hat no public off i c ial can offer. 
The Departmental off i cials Here not and could not be vested with the decision 
making authority necessary, if he were to replace or compete with the coastal 
consignor . The only way the Departmental officials coul d establish the 
necessary rapport with the fisherman was to organize liberal loans out of 
government funds . Fishermen were still indebted to their old financier, and 
so took loans from the new benefactor as well. These loans proved to be a 
tenuous.tink . Fishermen were torn between t wo loyalt ies. So they supplied 
to the coastal consignor in times of scarcity , when his price was also better 
than that of the Department and to the Department in times of glut. This 
t actic of dumping f ish on the Department in times of glut made the position 
1/ The function of fisheries has at various times been an appendage of 
the Ministry of Local Government, Industries, Agriculture and Lands, 
and Food and Agriculture, until for the first time a separate Fisheries 
Ministry was established in 1970. 
~ Fish marketing was undertaken by one of the state governments in 
Australia . 
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for the Department more difficult , because it was not able to cope with 
glut situations of a perishable commodity like fish . Additionally the 
Departmental cadres lacked expertise. By t he time they acquired the exper-
tise they began t o t hink and act like public servants in terms of fixed 
working hours , adherence to r ules and regulations, not intended for an 
operation like fishing . Above all the Department found itself in the dilemna 
of having to serve two masters - the fishermen who wanted the Department to 
better the price offered by the coastal wholesaler, and the consumer who 
wanted fish at lower pr i ces. At t he retailing end, t he monthly paid public 
servant was not concerned whether the day 's stock was sold , s t ored or spoiled. 
He did not believe in the marketing philosophy that t he customer is right. 
He di d not have t he authority t o vary prices to suit the cut, the time of 
day or the exigencies of the fish trade . The practice of selling fish 
through salaried employees was abandoned in 1948 and an association of edu-
cated youth organized to replace the public servants. This organization , 
styled the Fish Di stributors' Un i on , operating under the control of the 
Department worked on a commission basis and had a stake in the product . 
This step was a step i n the right direction and t hese pioneering educated 
youth certainly provi ded a better service than the salaried officials and this 
tended to reduce the l osses of the Department. Be that as it may , it is 
clear that the Department of Fisheries could not match the efficiency of t he 
private sect or . From the very f irst year of operation substantial losses 
were incurred as can be seen from Table 4 . 
• 
Trawler operation by the Department of Fisheries 
To increase the supply of fish available for distribution through 
it s marketing scheme , as also t o exploit the unexploited Wadge Bank for 
demersals, wh ich was a mere 24 hours steaming time from Colombo, the Depart -
ment entered the arena of large fishing boat operations . It purchased and 
operated nine vessels . (See Table 5) . The performance of these 
vessels, insofar as they are reported in t he administration reports of the 
Director of Fisheries are listed in Table 6 . 
Failure of the Fisheries Department b i g boat operations 
The venture of the Fisheries Depart ment into the arena of big boat 
operations was a loss, overall. There were two reasons for these losses. 
Firstly , the vessels and the support services like repairs, victualling, 
et c . were manned by public servants who had no share in t he catch or s t ake 
in the profitability of t he operation. The crew were hired on a basis of 
salary plus overtime. With one trip each month, the crew earned the maximum 
overtime permissible under government regulations . They were therefore not 
interested in a second trip on salary and no overtime. Secondly, those 
involved in the operation did not have the technology to keep t he vessels 
at maximum operational availability . Certainly , the poor performance of 
these vessels cannot be attributed to a lack of fish or a lack of the know-
how to catch that fish . Looking at t he Department's essay into fish market -
ing and boat operations, the conclus ion i s inescapable that the state sector 
is not suited for operations of t his nature. 
471 
Construction of cold rooms and ice plants by the De partment of 
Fisheries 
Since the fish brought in by these vessels was to be released into 
the market in controlled quantities and not dumped on the market, ice plants 
to provide ice for t he traHlers and storage facilities for holdt?g the catch 
became necessary and were constructed by the Department in 1957-
Achievements of the De partment of Fisheries operation 
What ever the commercial viability of the Department operations , the 
following can be considered achievements of t he Fisheries De partment oper-
ations . 
(a) It introduced the practice of selling fish by the weight. 
Hitherto, fish had been sold by the heap if wholesale and by the count or 
by the slice if retail . 
(b) It gave marketing advances to fishery cooperatives and individ-
ual fishermen, so that for the first time the coastal consignor's strangle -
hold on the fisherman was jeopardized. 
(c) By encouraging educated youth to take to fish consigning, fish 
wholesaling and fish retailing on a commi ssion basis, it introduced an aura 
of respectability to a trade which was traditionally in t he hands of an 
uneducated and obstreperous segment of society . 
(d) It filled the gap arising from the reluctance of the entrepre-
neurial class to invest in the fishing industry and commenced operating big 
boats, ice plants and cold storages . 
(e) Prices offered by the Department to fishermen operated as 
floor prices and coastal wholesalers l..,ere compelled to match them. 
(f) Big boat operations , which meant that a large quantity o~ fish 
was landed 3.t one single point enabled them to begin making secondary products 
like shark liver oil and fish meal . 
(g) Not to be outdone by the itinerant vendor, the De partment 
started a !l bungalow delivery!! sending fish from door to door in vans . This 
was a measure that was Hidely acclaimed by the housewife. 
4. THE COOPERATIVE SECTOR OPERATION 
The cooperative movement in Sri Lanka received a tremendous impetus 
during liorld liar II when government decided to distribute rationed and sub-
sidized commodities through consumer cooperatives . Similarly the Department of 
Fisheries, fish marketing scheme gave tremendous impetus to the cooperative 
movement among fishermen . To rece ive loans and benefits of the Department's 
minimum purchase price , fishermen were encouraged to form themselves into 
cooperatives . (Initially the Department f ish marketing scheme purchased 
11 Along with the trawler "Maple Leaf" Canada gave a munificient gift of a 
Fishery Harbour , Ice Plant , Cold Room Complex and Workshop. (This is 
sited at Mutwal ) 
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fish only from cooperatives but owing to inadequacy of supplies , purchases 
were later made from individual fishermen and even Coastal Consignors . ) 
Notwithstanding the formation of cooperatives, the Department 's 
fish marketing scheme was not getting adequate supplies and therefore was 
making no impact on the market or price of fish . It was operating at a loss 
and was a burden on the ex - chequer. Clearly this organization had to be 
replaced by an organization which derived its clout from the producer and 
which could operate as a commercial proposition , unhampered by government 
red tape , rules and regulations . 
The Ceyl on Cooperative Fish Sales Union, Ltd . (cooperative union) 
Thus in 1952 the Ceylon Cooperative Fish Sales Union, Ltd . was regis -
tered as an apex cooperative union to which primary producer societies were 
affiliated. It was a two-tier structure. The union was run by a Board of 
Directors, some elected by the membership at general meeting and some 
nominated by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies . Though ultimate author-
ity resided by law in the membership exercised through general meeting, real 
authority resided in the President and the Manager Secretary . Being a . 
federation of fishermen's cooperatives it was inevitable that the pol i cies 
and activities of the union were producer- interest oriented . (See Fig . 4 
for the place of the cooperative un i on) . 
Although the cooperative union was in theory an independent organi-
zation with supreme power vested in the membership at general meeting, in 
fact it was subject to the control of: 
(a) The Registrar of Cooperative Societies , who in terms of the 
by-laws nominated a little less than half the Directors of the Board . 
( b) The Director of Fisheries, who by virtue of the by-laws and 
being the biggest single supplier o~ fish to the union was also a member of 
the Board. Additionally, the Director of Fisheries was elected the Presi -
dent of the union from 1960 onwards . 
The market ing channels of the cooperative un ion 
The marketing channels of the cooperative union are shown in Fig . 5 . 
It must be noted that it was O?ly some o~ the Department ' s functions that 
were handed over to the CCFSU! . While the purchase of fish from fishermen 
and its sale to the consumer were handed over, the operations of trawlers, 
ice plants, storage facilities and the by- products factory were retained by 
the Department of Fisheries. However the entire catches of the Departmental 
trawlers were sold to the cooperative union, initially on a commission basis , 
and later at prenegotiated prices . 
1/ CCFSU = cooperative union 
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Ideally, the Cooperative Union should have obtained its supplies 
from Producer Cooperatives and sold through Consumer Cooperatives. But 
~ confining procurement of supplies to Fishery Coops would not have put 
sufficient supplies in the hands of the Cooperative Union nor resulted in 
the right product mix to please consumers. Therefore, purchases were also 
made from groups of fishermen, especially migrants and individual fishermen. 
In fact to obtain the right product mix, fish was even imported. 
The performance of the Cooperative Un ion 
After inevitable teething problems, the Cooperat ive Union settled 
down to functioning as a viable, dynamic organization and registered a satis-
factory record of growth. Its performance is listed in Table 7. 
Achievements of the Cooperative Union operation 
(a) The Cooperative Union's power base was the fishermen, who were 
its members. The fishermen's interests were therefore paramount in its~opera­
t i ons. The power base of the Department of Fisheries was the Ministry. The 
Department was therefore committed to serve the interests of consumers, who 
were more numerous, if not more vociferous than the fishermen. 
, (b) The Un ion won the respect and confidence of its member societies 
and the fishermen in general. It maintained excellent relations with them. 
(c) The Cooperative Union operation was a closely integrated operation. 
For supplies, it concentrated on remote areas where there was no competitive 
buying and fishermen were therefore exploited. It was thus able to make an 
immediate impact. For sales, it started in the metropolis and fanned outwards. 
It did not attempt island - wide coverage overnight . 
(d) The Cooperat ive Union took over from the Department of Fisheries 
. a losing activity and while gradually expanding it made it pay. 
, 
(e) It demonstrated for the first time in Sri Lanka that fish marketing 
on a more than localized basis could be done at a profit . All attempts, before 
and after, whether by Government Departments, Corporations or Companies, have 
resulted in a loss. 
(f) The Cooperative Union gave a guaranteed price to the fishermen. 
Coastal consignors, were therefore compelled to better these prices if they 
wanted to get supplies. The Cooperative Union's guaranteed prices were widely 
circulated and were therefore a powerful bargaining weapon in the hands of the 
f ishermen for a better price and a better deal f r om the Coasta l Consignors . 
(g) Not only did the Cooperative Union buy the entire catch at guaranteed 
prices, it took the admirable step of giving the fishermen a rebate, if a profit 
was made on his fish. 
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(h) When it was found that a black market was developing in fishing 
gear, the Union entered the field of fishing - gear import and sale and made the 
gear requirements of the fishermen available in adequate quantities and at 
r easonable prices. The performance of this act ivity is listed in Table 8 . 
(i) The frozen packetted fish dis tribution scheme. One of the most 
noteworthy achievements of the Cooperat ive Un ion was its Packetted Fish Scheme 
inaugurated in 1959. This was a daring cooperative innovation. At the time 
the Scheme was inaugurated, the cons umers ' general order of preference was a s 
follows : 
Uniced wet fish 
Iced wet fish 
Frozen fish 
Uniced wet fish is available only to those living in areas of pro-
duction and the immediate hinterland . Frozen fish was not handled by the 
private sector because wholesalers and retailers al ike, abhorred storing of 
fish. Their marketing strategy was to dispose of each day's stocks on that 
self- same day . Thus , most of the fish consumed in Sri Lanka was in the iced 
wet form . The Cooperative Union found that selling of iced wet fish, especially 
where cutting was involved , led t o argument with and complaints from the con-
sumer regarding the cuts and t he pricing of d ifferent cuts. Furthermore, the 
percentage of waste in cutting and retailing could not be calculated to a 
nicety , making accounting and stock-control a somewhat less than perfect 
exercise. Then there was the fact that the salaried sales - persons of the 
Cooperative Union di d not have the authority to reduce prices, if necessary, 
t o dispose of the days stocks. There was also the problem of storing left-
overs overnight at the point of sale. This required i ce to be distributed 
to t he point of sale and however well the leftovers were iced and stored 
overnight , the condit ion and appearance of the fish deteriorated . Additionally, 
customers were able to identify fish stored overnight and were reluctant to buy 
it. Furthermore, t he supplies from t he trawlers, which did 10- 14 day trips and 
would bring 80 tons on a good trip, were unloaded in a day or two . Fish un-
loaded in these quantities could not be disposed of on the day it was unloaded. 
It had to be deep frozen and stored f or lat er sale. Deep frozen fish when 
thawed and cut suffers in appearance and quality . A method had therefore 
t o be found for selling this f ish in the frozen form without a break in the 
cold chain. The Packetted Fish Scheme was the result. In controlled cond i -
tions , the frozen fish was band - s aw cut into convenient cuts, put in printed 
polyethylene bags , sealed, variety, weight and price marked and re - stored in 
master polyet hylene bags in t he col d rooms. Distribution was in insulated 
boxes in insulated trucks or by refrigerated trucks to fro zen food cabinets 
at the point of sale. Thus , t he cold chain was maintained . The advantages 
were: 
(i) The cutting was done under controlled conditions in a central 
place. 
(ii) Centralized cutting meant that the waste was available in one 
pl ace for conversion into fish meal. 
(iii) Since variety, weight and pr ice were indicated on each pack, 
customers were protected and were assured of correct variety, 
correct weight and correct price . 
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(iv) As compared to wet fish, this was an infinitely more hygienic, 
a less risky and a less complicated product to handle. Thereby, 
consumer cooperatives, food shops, chemists and indeed anyone 
was able to carry fish as his stock-in-trade. For the Coopera-
tive Union, this meant that there was a ready-made island-wide 
distribution network, waiting to be harnessed. 
(v) The commuter was able . to carry his fish requirements without 
incurring the disapproval of fellow passengers. 
(vi) The convenient form offset the prejudice against frozen fish 
and gradually wore out this prejudice. 
The popularity of this method of selling a difficult commodity can be seen 
from Table 9. The marketing channel is depicted in Sketch 6. 
Weaknesses of the Cooperative Union operation 
(a) Although with less government backing, less finances, less staff 
and less facilities, the Cooperative Union did an infinitely better job of 
fish marketing than did the Department, the Cooperative Union still did not 
have an adequate share of the market to become the price leader. Its supplies 
came from two main sources - the fishermen's cooperatives and the Departmental 
trawlers. The Cooperative Union had no control over both these sources. The 
organization of fishermen into cooperatives was a function of the Cooperative 
Department and the operation of trawlers was a function of the Fisheries 
Department. Depending on the efficiency of two government departments for 
its vital supplies made the Cooperative Union's situation unenvious and perilous. 
(b) The Central Storage in the metropol i s, to which and from which 75 
percent of the supplies carne and went belonged to the Department of Fisheries 
and the services of handling, freezing, storage and issue of fish was in the 
hands of public servants to whom the Cooperative Union was anathema, because 
the Union had taken over certain functions of the Department and had by its 
better performance highlighted the inefficiencies of the Department. Depen-
dence on the Fisheries Department for the handling and storage of Union fish 
was the biggest stumbling block to the success of the Cooperative Union. 
(c) The image of a cooperative as the food-shop at the corner of 
the street, inhibited government and foreign funding, and expansion of the 
cooperatives was not an element in the development strategy of the Government. 
:he Cooperative Un i on was, therefore, though wrongly, not envisioned as a vehicle 
for the development of the fishing industry. The Fisheri e s Corporation therefore 
wished it s demi s e . 
5. THE CEYLON FISHERIES CORPORATION OPERATION 
Just as it seemed the Cooperative Union had establishd itself as a 
viable enterprise equal to the challenge of serving the needs of a broad 
spectrum of fishermen and consumers and fulfilling its aims and objectives, 
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the Government, without consulting the fishermen, the trade and others 
concerned, decided to establish a Corporation for Fisheries. What motivated 
this step could well have been the difficulties encountered by a government 
department - the Fisheries Department - in managing a commercial operation 
like operating trawlers, ice plants, cold storages, by-products, etc. A 
corporation for these limited purposes may have been a step in the right 
direction, but the corporation that was, in fact, established had as its 
objectives the entire gamut of fishery activity and the Fisheries Corporation 
was conceived as a giant corporation and an empire -building exercise . 
Overtures made by the Cooperative Union to the Fisheries Corporation 
for a method whereby the Cooperative Union be allowed to continue its commercial 
activities and the Fisheries Corporation concentrate on providing t he necessary 
infrastructure, like harbours, ice plants, cold storage, etc. for the develop-
ment of the industry was not only rejected, but it was also made clear that 
the Corporation would flex its government muscle t o achieve its objects . The 
Cooperative Union had, therefore, to decide to hand over its commercial func -
tions, assets and staff to the Corporation. The Department of Fisheries, on 
the other hand, hamstrung by red tape and regulation was happy to hand over 
its commercial activities to the Corporation, while retaining statutory, 
regulatory, socio-economic and research functions. Thus, the trawlers, ice 
plants, cold storages and the by-products factory of the Department was also 
to be handed over to the Corporat ion. 
Thus on October 1, 1964, the Ceylon Fisheries Corporation was 
established. The objects of the Fisheries Corporation were spelled out i n 
the Incorporation Order, as follows: 
Obj ects of the Fisheries Corporation 
The purpose for which the industrial undertaking is constit uted shall 
be to undertake all or any of the following functions: 
(a) Fishing operations, including deep sea trawler fishing, to be 
undertaken directly by the Corporation or through authorized agents; 
(b) The processing of fish (including canning, curing and drying) 
and the manufacture of fish by-products, either directly by the Corporation 
or through authorized agents; 
(c) The wholesale or retail marketing and distribution of fish, either 
directly by the Corporat i on Or through authorized agents; 
(d) The construction and maintenance of fisheries harbours and 
fisheries shore installations, including cold rooms; 
(e) The import and export of fish and fish products; 
(f) The importation and sale of gear, tackle and other requirements 
necessary for the fishing industry; 
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(g) The execution of work for and on behalf of the Fisheries 
Department or any other government department, being work connected with 
or for the promotion of the f ishing industry; 
(h) The construction of boats and other craft for the fishing 
industry. 
(i) The provision of repair and maintenance facilities for fishing 
boats; 
(j) The manufacture and sale of fisheries requisites. 
The Fisheries Corporation ten-year development plan 
The first Board of Directors, nominated by the Minister in charge 
of the function of fisheries, proceeded to produce a highly ambitious though 
unrealistic ten-year development plan. Some of the plan targets juxta-posed 
against actuals are seen in Table 10. It will be seen from the table how 
the expectations generated by the plan to make Sri Lanka not only self-
sufficient in fish, but an exporter as well have not materialized. Far 
from generating profit as predicted in the plan, the Fisheries Corporation 
has become a burden on the Exchequer. 
Although the assumptions and magnitudes in the plan came in for a 
great deal of criticism and some ridicule, the plan served the purpose of 
spotlighting the potential and need for modernizing the fishing industry . 
At the same time, the Government decided on a high priority for the rapid 
development of the fishing industry. In this situation, the Corporation 
had no difficulty in obtaining the allocation of funds for the building of 
a vast empire that was in the minds of the first Board of Directors (see 
Figure 6 for the place of the Fisheries Corporation in the government orga-
nization). 
A separace Ministry of Fisheries 
In 1970, for the first time, a separate Ministry was established 
for the function of fisheries and this function was no longer an appendage 
of another Ministry. Nineteen hundred and seventy marks a watershed in the 
importance of the Fisheries Industry and Fisheries Development. 
By the end of 1971 and after seven years of operation, the losses 
of the Fisheries Corporation are seen in Table 11. 
Establishment of the Ceylon Fisheries Harbour Corporation 
In 1971, a team of foreign consultants engaged by the As i an Develop-
ment Bank , recommended that some of the functions, especially provision of 
infrastructure like fishery harbours, shore facilities, etc. be transferred 
to a new corporation. Accordingly, on February 11, 1972, the Ceylon Fishery 
Harbours Corporation was established. The objects of the new Corporation, 
as in the Incorporation Order, were: 
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(a) The establishment, construction and maintenance of fishery 
harbours, anchorages and shore facilities for fishing operations; 
(b) The operation and management of fishery harbours and anchorages 
for fishing operations; 
(c) The provision of repair and mai~tenance facilities for fishing 
craft ; 
(d) The establishment, maintenance and leasing out of cold room , 
ice plants, and other refrigeration facilities and the sale of ice; 
(e) The carrying out of investigations and studies for the deve -
lopment of fishery harbours and anchorages; 
(f) The imposition and recovery of charges and fees for the use of 
certain facilities. 
The Fisheries Corporation operation 
The predecessors of the Fisheries Corporation , namely the Department 
of Fisheries and the Cooperative Union had only a very small share of the 
market. The Corporation was bent on becoming the market leader and thereby 
the price leader, two positions its predecessors intended to achieve, but 
failed. The Corporat ion knew that he who controlled the ice controls t he 
movement of fish . Ice would be used as a weapon to obtain supplies for the 
Corporation and t hus make it the market leader. The Corporat ion, therefore, 
in a secretive, lightning operation, contracted with all the i ce plant s in 
the island to buy their entire production . It was not a takeover or nation-
alizat i on of the ice plants, though critics said it was tantamount to being 
so . There was a storm of protest from t he coastal consignors and metropolitan 
and inland wholesalers, who constituted a powerful lobby and possessed some 
political influence. Pressure was brought to bear on the government and on 
the instructions of the Minister the contracts were rescinded. This meant 
that the keystone of the Corporation's strategy was removed and the Corporation, 
like its predecessors, had to compete with the established traders for its 
supplies. 
The marketing channels of the Fisheries Corporation 
The marketing channels of the Fisheries Corporation are seen in 
Figure 7 . 
The performance of the Fisheries Corporat ion 
Table 12 shows the performance of the Fisheries Corporation for the 
years 1972-19.78, in respect of activities common to the Department of Fisheries 
operation and the Cooperative Un ion operation. 
The losses of the Fisheries Corporation for the years prior to 1972 
have been shown in Table 12. The losses of the Fisheries Corporation from 
inception to the end of 1978 amounts to Rs. 97 432 432 . Every year has been 
a loss. 
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The achievements of the Corporation operation 
In the light of the consistent losses incurred by the Fisheries 
Corporation, is it a contradiction in terms to cite any achievements of 
the Corporation? 
Be that as it may, the following can be considered achievements 
of the Fisheries Corporation: 
(a) It constructed infrastructure facilities in the nature of 
fishery harbours, cold storages, ice plants, and repair facilities; 
(b) It sought to introduce into the inshore fishery a two-monsoon 
boat that could brave both monsoons and as a first step introduced 30 Nos. 
11 meter multi - purpose boats; 
(c) It introduced 2 Nos. tuna boats (38 meters) to fish outside 
Sri Lanka's traditional and territorial waters. 
Weaknesses of the Fisheries Corporation operation 
When the establishment of a Fisheries Corporation was mooted , the 
Cooperative Union made the following suggestion: the Union should be 
allowed to continue as it had, while the Corporation should concentrate 
on infrastructure for the industry as a whole, and should introduce and 
operate larger vessels. If this had taken place, the Fisheries Corpor ation 
might not have turned into the fiasco it is now. The suggestions made by 
the Cooperative Union are as follows: 
"The relationship that the Ceylon Cooperative Fish Sales Un ion has 
hitherto maintained with the section of the Department of Fisheries which 
is engaged in trawler production has been of considerable assistance in 
maintaining a balance between the interests of the inshore fishermen and 
the influx of trawler produce in the consumer market. When a reorganiza -
tion of this section of the Fisheries Department is carried out, you would 
agree that the continuance of the same relationship would: -
(a) Maintain the same position vis- a - vis the inshore fishermen; 
(b) Relieve the burden on the new organization in the sphere of 
wholesale and retail marketing; 
(c) Provide the fishermen with strong apex organization which 
will be able to look after his interests as a producer, 
thus reducing the possible continuance of middlemen. 
The Ceylon Cooperative Fish Sales Union has a wealth of experience 
acquired by trial and error over the last 12 years and can thereby continue 
to be of assistance to the government t o market its trawler fish and to 
operate a marketing organization on a national scale without any cost to 
government either in capital costs or working expenses." 
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(b) The Fisheries Corporation sought to establish itself as a 
gigantic vertically integrated enterprise not realizing that the philosophy 
of economies of scale does not apply to a perishable commodity and to small-
scale fisheries in a developing country. 
(c) It failed to benefit from the experience of its predecessors, 
the Department of Fisheries and the Cooperative Union, that salaried employees 
were not suitable for a fishery operation of the magnitude it contemplated. 
(d) It failed to win the confidence of the fishermen - necessary 
for obtaining supplies. The fishermen regarded it as another rapacious trader. 
(e) It alienated the trade by its ice monopoly adventure. 
(f) Saddled with heavy overheads, it had to operate on high profit 
margins which made it unpopular with the consumer and the producer. 
(g) Failure to make an impact on the price of fish coupled with 
consistent losses have made it the despair of its single shareholder, the 
Government. 
(h) Above all, it showed no development; it did not come up with 
either a new product or a new strategy. It just kept on doing what was done 
by the Fisheries Department and the Cooperative Union, in spite of worldwide 
development in techniques of fish handling, fish storage and fish marketing. 
6. LESSONS TO BE LEARNED FROM THE SRI LANKA EXPERIENCE 
The Sri Lanka experience discussed in this paper covers a period 
extending from the early forties up to 1978, the following lessons may be 
noted, in order to avoid the same problems another time. 
(a) The Sri Lanka experience highlights the fact that in a small-
scale fishery, where fish is still highly perishable and fishing is in the 
hunting stage, free markets distribute it more efficiently than government 
bureaucracies do. Government departments and corporations are certainly not 
geared to the catching and marketing of fish. Both thes~ activities are best 
left to the private sector. 
(b) The Government and Corporation function is to provide the necessary 
infrastructure in the form of fishery harbours, shore installations, cold storages. 
ice plants, fishery roads and radio and telephonic communications. 
(c) The private sector will undertake the catching of fish by big 
boats if it is given fiscal and tax incentives to offset the high risk inherent 
in a small-scale fishery. 
(d) However, government intervention may be necessary to ensure that 
fish prices do not fluctuate unduly . This can be achieved if a corporation, 
not a government department, steps in as a buyer of last resort in times of 
glut. 
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(e) These inventories can be put out in times of scarcity in the 
packetted fish form where the risk element is minimized and existing private 
sector outlets can be utilized to sell the product . 
(f) An apex cooperative is eminently suited to market fish success-
fully because it can obtain supplies from its own membership and sell through 
consumer cooperatives and government food shops as well as private sector 
outlets . 
(g) The theory of economies of scale does not apply to fish marketing 
in a small-scale fishery . Giant organizations with many functions covering 
huge territories do not succeed . 
(h) Two fac t ors that militate against successful fish marketing on 
more than a localized scale are the dimensions of time and space . Movement 
of f i sh over distance and time puts up costs because as fish is moved , losses 
arising from shrinkage , spoilage, pilferage , malpractice, etc . increase 
i nexorably . 
(i) If the movement of fish is limited in space and time, the decision 
making authority can be delegated and simultaneously supervised . 
(j) Since in a small - scale fishery there are many imponderables, 
fishery planners must be pragmatic and practical persons . Plans must be so 
designed that i mplementation can be done on a stop - go basis . 
